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OF CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS

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BCAS/*Critical Asian Studies*
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CCAS Statement of Purpose

Critical Asian Studies *continues to be inspired by the statement of purpose formulated in 1969 by its parent organization, the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS). CCAS ceased to exist as an organization in 1979, but the BCAS board decided in 1993 that the CCAS Statement of Purpose should be published in our journal at least once a year.*

We first came together in opposition to the brutal aggression of the United States in Vietnam and to the complicity or silence of our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their research and the political posture of their profession. We are concerned about the present unwillingness of specialists to speak out against the implications of an Asian policy committed to ensuring American domination of much of Asia. We reject the legitimacy of this aim, and attempt to change this policy. We recognize that the present structure of the profession has often perverted scholarship and alienated many people in the field.

The Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars seeks to develop a humane and knowledgeable understanding of Asian societies and their efforts to maintain cultural integrity and to confront such problems as poverty, oppression, and imperialism. We realize that to be students of other peoples, we must first understand our relations to them.

CCAS wishes to create alternatives to the prevailing trends in scholarship on Asia, which too often spring from a parochial cultural perspective and serve selfish interests and expansionism. Our organization is designed to function as a catalyst, a communications network for both Asian and Western scholars, a provider of central resources for local chapters, and a community for the development of anti-imperialist research.

Passed, 28–30 March 1969
Boston, Massachusetts

c.c.a.s.
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A Critical Review of some Anti-Communist Perspectives in American Policy Towards Asia

[This is a revised version of an essay originally written in January 1968.]

By Herbert Bix

A "Moderate Statement on U.S. Policy in Asia" appeared in the *New York Times* on December 20, 1967. It continues to be circulated by the Public Affairs Institute of Freedom House under the title, "The United States and Eastern Asia." The highly publicized political labors of the Moderate Scholars, however, are characterized by a curious one-sided-ness. It is my contention that the thinking of the Moderate Scholars, as reflected in their policy statement, is politically and conceptually unsound. To examine the ideas and assumptions broached by the Fourteen is to glimpse the logic of the men who are managing the escalation in Southeast Asia.

The first moderate thesis is that there is an equivalency of interest on the part of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the larger nations of Asia—referred to collectively as the major societies of the "Asia Pacific region" — concerning "broad developments in the Pacific basin." This thesis suffers on a number of counts. In the first place, it is misleading to equate the U.S. and the Soviet Union as Pacific nations. The U.S., situated outside of Asia, is not an Asian nation, yet has increasingly come to exert control over much of Asia, manning bases around its rim, and waging war on its peoples. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is an Asian land power, sharing a border with China, and thus is actually in Asia as a people and not solely as an armed force. The misconception underlying this thesis not only betrays a conservative similarity of interest between two super-powers whose interests are in preserving the status quo in Asia. It also serves to mediate and thus temper the ideological opposition of the U.S. towards Communism in an Asian setting by making the USSR its partner. It thereby serves to obscure the counter-revolutionary bias of American foreign policy.

Secondly, the very term "Asia Pacific region" makes sense chiefly in terms of a geo-political analysis — a type of analysis which tends to overemphasize the necessity of militarily or economically controlling certain strategic regions regardless of the political consequences which such an attempt at control might have. Thus, Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union may, from his point of view, have been strategically warranted; politically, it was a disastrous miscalculation, the same should also be said of Johnson's decision to bomb North Vietnam. The Moderates' use of the term "Asia Pacific region" thus affords a semblance of genuine national interest for all future U.S. interventions in the affairs of Asian nations. By casting their discussion of U.S. policy in terms of the geo-political concept of the "Asia-Pacific basin" the Moderates avoid the challenge of establishing on political and moral grounds the legitimacy of U.S. intervention in Vietnam. Indeed, the application of geo-politics allows them to assert that the U.S., being an Asian power just like any other Asian power, is in Southeast Asia by right. This effectively makes discussion of other grounds irrelevant.

Connected with the idea of an equivalency of interest on the part of "Asia-Pacific region" societies is a notion of accommodation. The Moderates assert that these nations must "find means of accommodation or risk increasing dangers of confrontation." The danger supposedly emanates from Communist China, but to what end and with whom is the accommodation sought? What do the Moderates mean by accommodation? Do they mean that the nations of Asia must accommodate themselves to permanent U.S. naval domination of the Pacific Ocean and air-land control of Southeast Asia? Do they mean that peace in Asia awaits the realization by Mature" Asian elites 'that they cannot stand up to U.S. policy, and, hence, must accommodate themselves to it?

I suspect that the Moderates conceive of accommodation as a process whereby Asians (specifically Chinese and Vietnamese) grow up to accept the impossibility of defying U.S. foreign policy. If that is the case, then the accommodation that the Moderates have in mind is one that involves the prior surrender by Asian peoples of their right to participate in determining their relationship not only with the United States but with all other nations. Although the Moderates do not address themselves to the specifics of Vietnam, that country is illustrative of what they have in mind. It is the use of force to compel an Asian people whose culture and values are different from our own to submit (i.e. to accommodate themselves) to a government of American creation. The authors of the Moderate Statement shut their eyes to this situation. Yet they are men who have long recognized the unique cultures and problems of the Asian peoples. When it comes to Vietnam, however, they of all people cannot bring themselves to admit that a non-Western people might want to go a different way, adopt a different system from our own, set for themselves the course of their own destiny. Why this uncritical, "balanced" thinking on the part of the Asian experts who signed the Moderate Statement? Why this inability to see Vietnam in anything but strategic and ideological terms?

Perhaps the answer to that question lies in a mode of foreign policy analysis which makes such political and moral considerations irrelevant. The third Moderate thesis is that an effective foreign policy demands realistic thinking about policy alternatives in terms of a policy or means continuum. They urge in this regard that "we remain sufficiently flexible to permit carefully graded steps up or down on the policy continuum. We must never allow ourselves to be locked into one position indefinitely, or headed in one direction inexorably.... The ability to develop and defend policies attuned to limited objectives-including a policy of limited war—has become the vital test of the United States today."

This definition of American foreign policies in Asia in terms of a means or policy continuum type of analogy precludes consideration of whether U.S. power-extension should continue. The policy continuum which the Moderates use as a framework for thinking about U.S. foreign policies takes for granted that the U.S. is destined to be the world's policeman. On the basis of this assumption the Moderate scholars predicate a dichotomy between "incremental" and "totalistic" policy alternatives, with the former representing moderation and the latter extremism. As they put it, "The nuclear age above all is a time when 'totalistic' policies are to be avoided and 'incremental' policies pursued." Consideration both of the rationality and of the morality of American foreign policy objectives, however, is precluded by acceptance of any such utilitarian framework for thought. For, having once entered into this language, it becomes impossible to maintain a distinction between the present objectives of American foreign policy and any long range goals of American policy. Thus we are stuck with a utilitarian calculus of national interests which binds our reasoning to an uncritical acceptance of the present reality on its own terms. But if we limit our thinking about foreign policy to such a calculus of national interest, then we are also assuming egoistically that what is good for the United States is good for the entire non-Communist world. A means continuum framework for conceiving policy alternatives still demands that the general National Interest of the United States be satisfied first. Here, once again, the Moderates beg the question: Why is it in the "National Interest" of the American people to oversee Asian affairs?

Finally, if policy alternatives are conceived in terms of a policy (means) continuum, *as* the Moderates enjoin, they cease to be policy alternatives and become tactical alternatives. Once that happens, we have left the realm of foreign policy decision making and entered the realm of strategic (military) decision making. Thus, the flexibility that they have in mind is merely the operational flexibility required for implementing policy that has already been set — i.e., the policy of maximizing U.S. military power and combatting revolution. It is no accident that the Moderates employ the language of the civilian military strategists (Schelling, Huntington, et al.) to recommend that we change our "cultural values," and ask that we be willing to defend limited wars.

By expounding the policy continuum framework for thinking "realistically" about Asian policy, the Moderates seek to encourage the virtues of professionalism: moderation, flexibility, unemotional commitment, patience, discipline, etc. The language which they employ to defend and interpret American

foreign policy thus reflects and is in harmony with their instrumentalized conception of reason. “It is more difficult,” they say, “to pursue complex, incremental policies, having made careful calculations as to the full range of alternatives and the relative importance of the particular issue or region to us and to the world.” Clearly, it is not the inherent value of a policy that they are concerned with, nut with its pragmatic value, workability and effectiveness. What gives the Moderate Statement its gloss of ultra-sophistication is, in part, this ethic of professionalism which it brings to the question of the U.S. role in Asia—an ethic of expertise whose efficacy they assume so blandly and expound so frankly. On the other hand, what gives the Statement its exhortatory force is the moral outlook conveyed by its cool, moderate language. Yet it is a bifurcated sort of moral outlook, one reserved for dealing with those (the practitioners of mea culpa?) who would question the purposes of their whole “one dimensional” foreign policy framework of thinking. When it comes to dealing with the critics, the “realistic” thinking of the Moderates is then assumed to be a value in itself — a moral instrument with which to mystify the non-specialist and flail the New Left.

The notion of responsibility embedded in the Moderate Statement encourages personal irresponsibility. “Our political leaders, our intellectual community, and our mass media each bear heavy responsibilities with respect to [foreign policy] matters. And these responsibilities,” say the Moderates, “are not currently being discharged satisfactorily in any quarter.” The Fourteen Scholars are concerned with stimulating the intellectual elite to fulfill its ideological task of providing leadership so that the consensus theoretically underlying the Great Society can be reestablished. Responsibility is used as a synonym for a collective accountability for the performance of elite group functions. In effect, the Moderates are telling us that “our intellectual community,” “our mass media,” and “our politicians” are responsible as elites to the National Interest (the State). Their error here is as fundamental as its consequences are harmful.

The Moderates imply that the proper ideological framework within which U.S. foreign policy should be debated is one in which the three participants acknowledge beforehand a partnership in responsibility. Since they regard an essential harmony of interest on the part of the debaters as the defining characteristic of responsible debate, they are led to subsume “responsible discussion” under the broader concept of National Duty. In that way responsibility is conceptualized in an institutional or elite group sense. Such an external, elitist notion of responsibility is unworthy of “the Moderate scholars.” If one can even speak of an intellectual community, one must point out that today the scholar in the university implicitly supports the State and its foreign strategy only at the cost of violating his higher commitment to speak the truth.

To sum up: When the Moderates speak of responsibility, it is not responsibility as such. For that is, and can only be, an individual and internal thing. The burden of accountability in their view falls on the elite group itself and on the role that the Moderates prescribe, not on the acting individual. Thus it is not surprising that the Moderates feel no guilt about Vietnam and are so eager to think “beyond Vietnam.” Their language and elitist mode of thought have insulated them from such a harsh reality: in this sense too they are at one with their fellow intellectuals who are “managing” the escalation. The “rational, moderate position” on U.S. policy in Asia not only offers a military-strategic definition of the world scene, but also encourages individual irresponsibility in the academic community, in the press corps, and in the ruling establishment. Actually, the deepest concern of the men who signed the Moderate Statement is with the growing lack of discipline among the people, their weakening will to wage a “limited^ war which places no limits on the destruction of the Vietnamese people and Vietnamese society. Concentration on domestic problems and a rising demand that we have no more limited wars are disquieting spectres indeed to those who have assimilated completely the logic of a global strategy of nuclear and conventional force deterrence. For in the final analysis, what makes a deterrent force effective is the will to fight. Therein lies the task of intellectuals of the Moderate stamp — to reestablish an intellectual consensus on American foreign policy that allows for the waging of limited wars.

War with China and Enlightened American Newspapers

By Ed Friedman (Department of History, University of Wisconsin)

Men of liberal, enlightened political opinion readily see that it is costly and impolitic to commit $5 billion to the Sentinel Anti-Ballistic Missile System. They do not see that it is aggressive and provocative. During the summer of 1968 they carried their common concern to and through the *New York Times* (July 14) and the *Wall Street Journal* (August 15). The writers for both papers could show that the thin ABM defense was no defense against the USSR and might produce an $80 billion escalation of the arms race merely to maintain the so-called balance of terror. But how did they respond to the notion that the ABM system was needed to deter China from attacking the USA?

China would have to be mad to initiate an attack on the USA. Alice Hsieh argues against the Sentinel system because she disagrees with the apparent assumption of the Pentagon that "the Chinese are prepared to commit suicide." (*WSJ*) Nonetheless, an Assistant Secretary of Defense thinks that "in a crisis" China might strike first, incorrectly believing we were about to do the same. Why incorrect? Is it so impossible to conceive of America attacking China? China's America-watchers know that "Before his death. President Kennedy considered using A-11's," Stewart Alsop tells us in *The Center,* "to eliminate the nuclear plants then being completed by the Chinese Communists." The ABM system must convince China that we are considering a first-strike and are creating a defense against her counterattack. This point has been made by both Russian and American physicists. (*New York Times,* August 25, 1968) The Sentinel then brings closer the disaster it is supposed to prevent.

Perhaps it would be more rational therefore to overlook the U.S. government's shoddy rationale and look into the base logic of self-interest that might have led certain congressmen, munitions manufacturers, local civic groups and Pentagon officials to force forward this new, costly and dangerous system, to investigate the fanatic ideology that makes America a threat to world peace. The Chinese in addition know from the Miami Herald's report that Richard Nixon told a secret gathering of southern Republicans on August 6, 1968: "How do you bring a war to a conclusion? I'll tell you how Korea was ended....Eisenhower let the word go out...to the Chinese and North [Koreans] that he would not tolerate this continual ground war of attrition. And within a matter of months, they negotiated. Well, as far as negotiations are concerned (in Vietnam] that should be our position."

Eisenhower, according to his memoirs, believes he brought China to the conference table in Korea *by* the threat of nuclear attack. But the Chinese insist that they have built their bombs to stop American applied not only in Korea but also in the Formosa Straits crisis of 1958 and to deter China from responding to American intervention in the Vietnam War. What happens when next we practice brinksmanship and Peking calls our "bluff"?

Of course a reader of our enlightened newspapers has no way of knowing that speculation over the consequences of Sentinel is related to real foreign policy concerns. All we meet are abstract defensive Americans and possibly irrational Chinese.

Ralph Lapp in the *New York Times* wonders why "we assume that Red China would act irrationally" and start a nuclear war. Mr. Lapp's own article offers some clues for solving the mystery. He discusses possible Chinese foreign policy in terms of threat, blackmail, catastrophe, an analogy with Hitler, terror, and targets on the California coast "if and when they set their sights on U.S. cities." In the same breath, Mr. Lapp innocently complains that popular opinion makes it difficult to act rationally in foreign policy. But clearly it is enlightened men such as Mr. Lapp who created and still share that popular opinion of an irrational, aggressive China.

Why cannot Mr. Lapp comprehend his own comparison of the abandonment of the "free world" by Chinese scientists as, according to Mr. Lapp, "the Asian counterpart of the flow of refugee scientists

from Europe to America before World War II"? Certainly these Chinese scientists, along with US intelligence and the China specialists who testified before the Fulbright Committee and Mr. Lapp himself know that "in Vietnam" China has acted "responsibly," cautiously, in *defense* of her most immediate interests against an antagonistic America. Mr. Lapp is willing to explain Russian military moves as, in part, responses to American military threats. Why not Chinese?

Why can't a China which was told by General Marshall that only preoccupation with Europe and a lack of military resources kept the USA from fighting the Chinese Communists in the late 1940's, which knows from its study of the Laotian crisis that all that kept the USA from intervening in Laos in 1961 as it did in Vietnam in 1965 was the lack of the military wherewithal — why can't this China rationally believe that the creation of the light ABM shield will permit America to strike the Chinese heartland at the end of the I960's, as it could not at the start of the 1960's? What then would be a rational Chinese response?

The Chinese now see right-wing forces growing more powerful in the USA, pushing America in a more aggressively anti-Communist, counter-revolutionary direction. Sentinel is a part of that thrust. And the enlightened opinion of Ralph Lapp, who at least 24 times in his short essay describes China as "Red China," who is afraid of irrational public opinion actually created by enlightened opinion-makers, is insufficiently enlightened to understand that it is expansionist American policies which are again pushing us toward the brink of war with China.

The McCarren Hearings and Chinese Studies

The CCAS has organized a panel entitled, "The Effects of the McCarren Hearings on the field of China Studies" at the next convention of the Association for Asian Studies, March 28-30. 0. Edmund Clubb will discuss the effects on foreign policy, Ross Y. Koen will focus on the relationship between pressure groups, the government, and the academy, and Howard Zinn will analyze the moral and social obligations of the scholar. Robert J. Lifton will act as chairman. Depending upon the quality of the panel and the nature of the following discussion, we plan to edit the papers and comments into a pamphlet. This panel will concentrate on the influences which have shaped our field and on the responsibilities we have as scholars. Following the panel, there will be a CCAS cocktail party in the hotel where the audience can speak more informally with the panelists. Anyone interested in more information on this panel should contact Richard C. Kagan, 1737 Cambridge St., Room 304, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

A Meditation on Catonsville

By Stanley Spector (Chairman of the Department of Chinese and Japanese, Washington University)

(Oct. 10) Tonight nine people and I were found guilty; nine for having succeeded, I for having failed. The State has provided a prison for them; I provide my own. I must try to recall, to imbed in my mind's eye their faces, for they are people, too, not just symbols. I must not forget they are people, not the habitual abstractions and personified reconstructions of an historian.

Father Daniel Berrigan: His turtleneck is like a cleric's collar. The pendant could be a cross. Perhaps it was, even though it is a square plate. I keep having the feeling that he is a priest. He brought back three American airmen from Hanoi, helped deliver them from incarceration in Vietnam. Now three out and one in. Not symmetrical, but mystical: his trinity leads to unity. And three times three make nine.

Father Philip Berrigan: The husky grey-haired convict. (Six years for spilling his own blood.) David Darst: My Christian brother. How strange, we had to go to Baltimore to meet.

John Hogan: Maryknoll Brother and carpenter. I think of another humble carpenter. (He comes up to me after testifying, a good smile is there: "You know, Dr. Spector, I was very frightened before the trial. I kept having butterflies in my stomach. But once I was called up, I felt fine. I feel fine now.")

Thomas Melville: He was a Maryknoll priest when he established the John 23rd Land Distribution Program in Guatemala. "I don't want what is happening in Vietnam to happen in Guatemala." I can't follow his reasoning. Maybe that's what drove him to crime at Catonsville on May 17, 1968, only four months after his return to the United States.

Marjorie Melville: A Webster College girl for a while, schoolmate of Jacqueline Brennan. How different their fortunes! What happened to this nun in Guatemala, among those students and peasants?

George Mische: Another of those devout Roman Catholics. His route to crime was via service for the U.S. Government in the Alliance for Progress. He looks so square and solid, his eyes so steady and clear; how could our policy in the Dominican Republic and the bombing of North Vietnam so upset him? He hardly seems the type for *crime passionne!*

Mary Moylan: R.C. and R.N. The American male's dream, a pretty red-headed nurse. Three years in Africa serving the physically ill. It's not hard to see how she should turn to the Peace Movement. I think of Dr. Sun Yat Sen (how appropriate, today is the 57th anniversary of the Chinese Republic) and of Lu Hsun both of whom turned from medicine to attempt the cures that only political activity could bring.

Thomas Lewis: A painter. When he testifies his hands are restless, someone should have handed him a brush. I doubt if the thin-lipped jury much liked his picture. It has words painted on it, just like a Chinese painting. Probably he is not the first artist to go to jail for his paintings. The last jury gave him six years for painting draft records with his blood. He wants to say more but can't seem to find the words. I cannot wipe from my mind the sight of him looking so helplessly to the jury, the judge and to me.

These are my companions in prison. How will I spend these years of my sentence on the campus of WU, in the sunshine, along the tree-lined walk from the Quadrangle to Graham Chapel? For the past two days young priests in the courtroom, at St. Ignatius Church, in front of the Baltimore Post Office have been confessing to me, in troubled, searching terms. To whom may I confess?

Where were the young rabbis? I turned to the Yippies and Peaceniks around me. I am convinced that the police bathed. After a day in those helmets, faces behind adjustable plastic knightly visors, carrying their terrific gear, sweating from tension and politeness, they must need to bathe. But even if they didn't it's all right. For they were good, restrained, helpful. It is not their fault if lined two to five

deep, with all that reflection from helmets and boots and buttons and badges they suggest something of 1934 or ’44 or ’84. We are driving them to it, and we cannot do otherwise.

Nine devouts seized the 1-A, 2-A and 1-Y records of Draft Board 33, Catonsville (pronounced like Harper’s Ferry usually; some friends make it sound like Jerusalem. Which is right I do not know since I am in Chinese History; Ancient and American are “outside my field”) and with love aforethought did pour napalm on 258 files and set them afire in a parking lot. Such desecration of our Sanctus Sanctorum, the Auto Parking Lot, may be the unsuspected trigger for our prosecution of these now-criminals. The government has not raised this issue. My prosecuting attorney and judge have narrowed the issue to the seizure and destruction of U.S. (my) property valued at more than $100 (according to the labor theory of value as explained in court), use of force and violence in doing so, and willful interference with the operation of my Selective Service System. My defense counsel try [*sic*] to demonstrate that something more and something higher is at stake. We, the defendants, wish to try the Vietnam War, the Draft, the conscience of our fellow-citizens, may they continue to rest in peace. We, the lawed-and-ordered community, wish to establish limits on the acts of individuals to preserve systems and institutions which have served us well and necessarily to date.

A phone call from Cambridge, another from Baltimore, and I am on the spot. I am needed as an expert witness by the defense. If my testimony is disallowed, I will be heard by the Press, in forums, at rallies. (Why do I meditate on the past in the present tense?) But I know the frailties of my Ph.D., the accidents of my appointments and promotions, the gaps and omissions in my education, the vagaries of International Law, the profundity of the issue. I do not know the defendants, although I have a haunting sense of having seen them in boyhood dreams.

Going, I am dishonest, for the question of civil disobedience is not fully settled in my mind, for I am not adequate to what my degree and reputation promise. Eighteen, thirty or fifty four years in prison for the Catonsville Nine is a heavy price for satisfying my vanity. Not going I am a charlatan, for I basked in student approval at teach-ins. Too, do I fear retaliation — not against my tenured person — but against an institution and a department which has been so much of my life? And what of my colleagues and students? Far better to stay back and let others more competent come forward.

My trial has commenced. My guts pull me toward Baltimore, my rational mind says. “wait.” My training says**,** “the truth is unclear,” my conscience says, “go.”

Where are the competents? Who have come forward? Where are my teachers?

Steve, I say, “Who are the Nine?” “They are magnificent,” answers my friend. “Dick,” I ask, “what are they?” His response is two words, “beautiful people.” “Mark, will I be of help?” “If you can’t, who can?”

In a pose of pedagogical leadership: “Graduate students, do you think I should go?” They drive me to the airport.

Now, students, colleagues, I must turn back to you, for I cannot think without people. Nor can this be a private affair. I was spared the ridicule and barbs of my fellow scholars: the prosecution conceded our point (“a historic development,” wrote the *New York Times*) and the three expert “expert” witnesses (where were the others?) were excused with a flourish worthy of Clarence Darrow himself. It was allowed by my court and legal machinery that reasonable men could question the legality of the Vietnam War and particularly of our bombing of North Vietnam. We did not win the case before the jury, but we won an inch of territory, we gained a drop of conscience. Will the Milwaukee Fourteen add another?

I turn to you, because I cannot bear these years in prison without you, and something of Brother John stays with me. I find I can enjoy success quite alone, but in failure I need community. Where was the well-honed scholar’s mind when he had to struggle to hold back tears in court? What would my

History and Philosophy teachers (and students) think if they could have seen the jumble in my mind (Jesus, Brown, Galileo, Gandhi, Mikhailovič, and all the anonymous ones, yellow, brown, black, white, those faces I invent).

I have failed. My years in Asia, my years in classes on Asia, what have they meant for understanding and concern on the part of my countrymen? The academic ladder has drawn me away from students and study.…thanks, Yippies for receiving me back. How can I be administrator, student and concerned citizen? The either/or way cannot be the answer. We are sloppy, my students and I. The truth is this. These years in jail demand total work; scholarship and fellowship are inseparable. Refinement of thought, refinement of research and refinement of spirit must be my Trinity. There is light between the bars, and prisons become cathedrals.

Can We Study Chinese in Taiwan?

By Richard C. Kagan

Both the radical who spurns Taiwan for fear of political contamination which would prevent his future trip to the Mainland and goes to Hong Kong, and the liberal American scholar who, in Taiwan, fears that involvement in Taiwanese affairs will jeopardize his research, share a mentality that makes their activity abroad one of academic imperialism. Most students go to Taiwan primarily to study Chinese. The way in which they do this is implicitly imperialistic. Initially, by learning Mandarin, a Peking dialect, the student is out of touch with the majority of the population on Taiwan. His accent, grammar, and expressions all stem from a region geographically and intellectually foreign to Taiwan, and are preserved and transmitted from pre-1949, in such texts as the Yale series, Chao Yuan-jen's *Mandarin Primer,* and even John de Francis' volumes. A major justification for using the Northern dialect, given by a director of the Inter-University Program for Chinese Language Studies (I.U.P.) betrays most vividly the imperialistic dimension of learning Mandarin: We learn the Peking dialect because it is spoken on the Mainland and we are preparing students to return to China. . We are only in Taiwan temporarily. Our main interest is China and hence the Chinese spoken on the Mainland.

To teach Mandarin, the I.U.P. must employ mainlanders whose principal qualification is that they were born into a family speaking pure Peking-hua. As exiles with a language skill outdated and socially irrelevant on Taiwan, their life is precarious and their society exhibits all the ingrownness of exile groups. (The teachers ostracized the single Taiwanese, a linguist, in the center.) Their relation with Americans gives them economic security and status, and they utilize their position to communicate their cultural and social viewpoints to their students. They are active agents in perpetuating the goals of Nationalist and U.S. foreign policy -- *the* perennial return to the Mainland and the relegation of Taiwan to the interests of the minority of ruling mainlanders.

The demands of learning Mandarin preclude study of *kuo-yü* as spoken on Taiwan and of Taiwanese manners, customs, or culture. On New Year's Day, for example, the I.U.P. offered a lecture on "New Year's Day in Peking" (circa 1930). Under one director social intercourse with Taiwanese was discouraged because it would impair the purity of our Northern accents! Instead of reading about Sun Moon Lake near Taichung, we read about West Lake near Hangchou; instead of discussing current literature like the novel *Beyond the Window* (Ch'uang Wai), we discussed Ming novels. Instead of learning the history of Taiwan, we read a history of China; instead of becoming familiar with the bus routes in Taipei, we read about Peking streets. Class extends even into the home. A Northern cook with pure pronunciation is recommended by the I.U.P., and she becomes your cultural informant as well. Who in the U.S. would rely on his cleaning lady to tell him about the United States — unless, of course, she were black. Thus>linguistically and culturally the student is oriented toward and identifies with the old order, an order which is exploiting Taiwan for its own and the United States' purposes .

A strategy that can be adopted to prevent falling into this trap is to assert a non-academic objective for one's language and training. Learn how to express yourself in the language current in Taiwan. Pursue your own literary, topical, and social interests rather than settling into a pre-fabricated relationship with a decadent language and a social anachronism for a teacher. Seek out your counterparts -- intellectuals, political activists, artistic leaders, new artists, young scholars, teachers, filmmakers, athletes. Instead of attending grate "B" western movies, as is the rage in Taiwan, why not see Chinese or Taiwanese films? In other words, make yourself an authority on Taiwan by stepping outside of the isolated world of Mainland language teachers and become an active observer of Taiwan in the *same* way you would observe New York, Boston, Chicago, or Atlanta.

What I feel is desperately needed is a continuation of the Edgar Snow, Jack Belden, Derk Bodde scholar-observer tradition. Few people look into Taiwan in the same manner that the young Belden looked into China. Instead of waiting for a second-generation Taiwan Hand to analyze Taiwan in the 60's and the role of American scholars, why don't we become involved in critical analysis right now? One could begin with the history of the I.U.P., by discussing its decision to establish the center on Taiwan instead of Hong Kong. How much was this decision based on the incentives that the Nationalist government gave to the initial I.U.P students (e.g. duty-free import privileges, a library of Communist Chinese materials) and what effect has the withdrawal of many of these enducements had upon the I.U.P.'s raison d'etre? Why do some directors instruct their students not to write adverse letters about Taiwan to their congressmen?

Why not focus on Taiwan as a political or historical problem, using our experience to enrich our findings? Many recent articles on Taiwan by visiting scholars could have been written entirely from the stacks at Cal, Harvard, or Columbia. Outstanding examples of perceptive writing which grew out of their experience are articles by Mark Plummer and Stephen Uhalley. They break out of the common, stereotyped views of Taiwan which focus on Chiang Ching-kuo's imminent succession, Taiwan–mainlander rivalries, army intrigues, and the "unrealistic" foreign policy of America.

A footnote should be added about the radical who spurns Taiwan for Hong Kong. Even without cultivating his Mandarin, he drifts into an imperialistic style of life, living well, going to all the social events, and working his way up the colonial-scholar ladder of status: government officials, newsmen, senior scholars on sabbatical, and all the "best" restaurants. There is little attempt to discover the moral and political ambiguities in the British position, to become involved with intellectuals who are bucking the system, to align with social movements, or to understand the complex and contradictory relationships within and between the radical and reactionary movements. (Of course, an anthropologist or political scientist might study these in proper academic detachment if supported by a Ford, Carnegie, or some other grant.)

Hong Kong is a nineteenth century colonial phenomenon. Taiwan is here to stay. It is neither a language lab nor a place to justify our grants and professional positions. It is necessary that scholars study in Taiwan in order to become involved in a country that we can see and that we will be concerned with for years to come. This involvement should reflect and complement our own activities in this country, for knowledge comes through involvement.

C.C.A.S. in Boston, March 1969

The CCAS Conference, earlier agreed to in Philadelphia, will be held in Boston during the week of the AAS Convention. Mark Selden and I have agreed to act as conference coordinators. Correspondence, however, will be handled through my Cambridge address for logistic reasons. Since the conference is designed to express the concerns of all those involved in CCAS, the role of the coordinators is merely to circulate ideas among the local chapters so agreement on the nature of the conference can be obtained.

Local chapters and individuals interested in promoting the objectives of the CCAS should respond as quickly as possible to the following problems.

1) Organizational

a) The time of the conference. Should it be held a day before or after the AAS, or concurrent with a part of it?

b) The length and nature of the conference. Should there be a large general meeting with a panel or

individual speakers and workshops? If relatively small but numerable groups are planned they might be held in hotel rooms. Or, alternately, they might be located in larger areas close to the hotel. What format would you suggest?

c) A meeting of CCAS representatives, in Boston on March 27th will decide on the conference's final form.

2) Content

If there is a general meeting, would you favor a panel or individual speakers outlining the problems we face and the role of the CCAS?

Some suggested topics for workshops or smaller discussions are the following:

(1) The influence and effect of experts in areas of Asian studies on government policy (or, the role of government financing on research and its effects).

(2) Professional prospects for "radicals" in Asian studies.

(3) Teaching approaches towards Asia, the need for curriculum reform and re-orientation at the university level.

(4) Local CCAS chapters and their work — accomplishments and prospects.

(5) The role of "imperialism" and "racism" in the formation of American foreign policy in Asia.

(6) The ethics of resistance — the moral issues raised by the war in Vietnam and America's use of power in other areas of Asia.

(7) Wars of National Liberation as a method of social and economic change, or American attitudes towards change and revolution and its effect on policy formation.

What relationship would you envisage between a general meeting and the workshops?

If discussions are held, how should they be conducted, e.g., is there a desire to move away from formal papers and tightly controlled panel discussions? How should the participants be selected?

Such are a few of the conference's problems. Arrangements for accommodations must be made soon and quick replies would be appreciated. Your replies will be circulated to the various CCAS units so that general agreement and mutual understanding are obtained.

By Jim Peck

67A Dana Street

Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Toward The Revitalization of Asian Scholarship

By Mark Selden (Department of History, Washington University)

The issue was the complex one of the relationship between knowledge and power and between the scholar and the politician: knowledge to serve what ends? The urgency of student challenge last spring in the Vietnam Caucus and the troubling intellectual and political questions raised by the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars jarred a number of us from the comfortable routine of scholarship. The n'th monograph (even for those diligently attempting to prepare our first or a dissertation) no longer seemed self-evidently justifying under conditions of crisis over Vietnam and. American Asian policy. The rhetoric of "objective scholarship" had a hollow ring as we saw the product of twenty years of Asian scholarship channeled into the military and intelligence system of destruction in Vietnam and elsewhere. How was it that the 'Tuxedo Fourteen" had succeeded in projecting themselves as spokesman for the profession in support of the administration's Asian policy while the powerful denunciation registered by 650 Asian scholars at the Vietnam Caucus was "not news"? To what extent had the ideals of independent scholarship been traded for the affluent safety of foundation and government support? In what ways were all of us the captives of liberal myths and rhetoric applied uncritically to Asian problems?

Twenty graduate students and teachers in Asian Studies from half a dozen universities throughout the country gathered this summer in Cambridge to consider the state of the profession in the context of American society: its history, its financing, its values and models, its political impact and the impact of politics upon it. It would be gratifying to present the final results so that we could return with eased conscience to business as usual. At this juncture we can only report that critical (and neglected) problems have been isolated and defined, and most important that a serious, continuing effort is being made in year long student-sponsored seminars at Berkeley, Harvard, Columbia and elsewhere to bring these concerns to their legitimate place at the center of attention for all of us in the Asian field at a time when similar endeavors are being launched in virtually every discipline. In addition a volume of papers on Asia and the United States: Critical Re-appraisals is in preparation.

From the outset our related concerns, Asian scholarship and American society, pulled us in diverse directions reflecting the different priorities of individuals within the group. We began by attempting to raise relevant issues about American society, values and education, seeking to provide a context for the development of the profession and its relationship to American institutions and policy-making. These issues were explored in the context of readings in Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, *The Academic Revolution,* Irving Horowitz, *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot: Studies in the Relationship Between Government and Social Science,* Barton Bernstein, *Towards a New Past, Dissenting Essays in American History,* and Theodore Roszak, *The Dissenting Academy,* among others.

From this beginning, indeed, to the frustration of many, just as we were starting to scratch the surface of the larger issues of American society, the main focus of the seminar shifted to an exploration of the institutional and scholarly development of the profession. Complex issues of the role of the universities, foundations and government, particularly defense and intelligence agencies, in financing and developing the Asian field were raised in the context of questions of intellectual sponsorship and control. The necessity for further study of the evolution of the profession in relation to evolving missionary and cold war priorities, and particularly exploration of the impact of the McCarran-McCarthy purge of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the State Department's China branch were underlined.

At this point our effort shifted to the values, methodology and perspectives of Asian scholarship through analysis of the field's central issues-American-Asian relations, revolutionary war and

modernization. In considering such problems as American attitudes toward Japan, the origins of Sino-American confrontation, the Chinese model for social transformation and analysis of American high school texts dealing with China, we sought common American denominators in treating diverse problems. Our goal was to move beyond analysis and critique to the presentation of new hypotheses, to raise new questions and provide new perspectives for reinterpreting Asian and American-Asian relations. As we perceived in various contexts the reflection of cold war values and the perpetuation of narrow nationalistic interests implicit or explicit in the models and conclusions of the major scholarly works — the endless rationalization of American expansionism, the bitter hostility to China, and counter-revolutionary bias underlying our models for modernization, and totalitarianism, the ignoring of certain crucial but embarrassing issues such as the record of American imperialism in the Philippines — it became possible to contemplate new yardsticks for evaluating historical experience. In this we have only just begun, but certain possibilities are beginning to emerge: the necessity to evaluate China (and other Asian nations) less in terms of the international national Communist menace and more in terms of the immense problems confronting the poverty-stricken nations of the third world and the human costs of varying approaches to social change; the imperative to critically re-evaluate the origins of cold and hot war in Asia and the nature of American domination with greater attention to the perspective of Asian nations rather than through the glowing rhetoric of democracy and reform emanating from Washington.

To recognize the role of Asian scholarship in providing a rationale at home for American military expansion in Asia, and for the propagation abroad of liberal capitalism and American protection as the royal road to development and social change, is merely the beginning of the effort to create a more truthful and humane scholarship. It does not even begin to address the question of turning new insights into politically relevant dicta. But it is a beginning.

The C.C.A.S. Summer Seminar

By Jim Peck

> The truth is not in
> triumphing. It is
> merely what remains
> when everything else
> has been squandered
> away.
>
> — Ludvik Vaculik,
> "Manifesto of Two Thousand
> Words," June 1968.
> *New Yorker,* 23, 9/7/58

We spent the summer asking questions in a world without many answers. Certainly it would be gratifying to report the results of the summer seminar in simple declarative sentences unmarked by a great clutter of modifiers and qualifiers. My inability to do this reflects not just the difficulty of summarizing diverse opinions and personal styles. It also marks the difference between being angry, sure, and simple about our problems and being still angry but unsure and aware of the difficulty of defining them. For the problems involved in placing American actions in Asia in perspective are so immense that few of us were left with the questions, still less the answers, in sharp focus.

Discussions within and without the seminar concentrated around two foci: how to understand American society and its foreign policy in Asia, and how to change them. This required an estimation of the degree to which self-images, thought processes, and struggles for political power and wealth in the United States are important contributors to American foreign policy. Fundamentally, though, it meant an

examination of the assumptions shared by much of contemporary scholarship on Asia and the nature of our own assumptions. It would be inaccurate to suggest that our questioning of America and its role in the world took place at the expense of a concern with such areas as China. For scholarship devoted to the latter requires knowledge of the former. It is indicative of the nature of Chinese studies in this nation that so much time had to be spent examining our own cultural assumptions. For a field that prides itself on its awareness of "cultural differences," we are often profoundly ignorant of their import in our own work.

It was not just the nature of our scholarly assumptions, however, which was challenged. Could we, even while abhoring the ends towards which our research and knowledge are put, do nothing more than polish off another definitive monograph or book while pleasantly chatting with a CIA analyst over lunch about our mutual problems involved in understanding China? What, precisely, was our social role? We debated this with Noam Chomsky and constantly among ourselves. And on a theoretical level, at least, the result wasn't impressive; we ended with the truism that truth by nature is radical and the responsibility of intellectuals is to speak the truth and to expose lies. Or, in the words of Camus, the intellectuals' role "will be to say the king is naked when he is, and not to go into raptures over his imaginary trappings."

On a practical level, however, this truism seemed twisted and distorted by the environment in which most of us immediately worked — the university. It wasn't just the ties with the government which caused concern. Rather, the relation has become so close, so extensive, and so highly valued, that the line which separates the government from the academy is blurred, and specialists are not only proving incapable of distinguishing between the aims of governments and of the university, but are allowing themselves to become instruments of the state. "The danger" for the universities, as Senator Fulbright warns, "goes far beyond contractual associations with the CIA, which, unfortunate though they are, are so egregious that once they become known, there is a tendency to terminate them with all possible haste, although at a lasting cost to the integrity of the institutions involved." Rather "the danger lies in the extent and the conditions, implicit as well as explicit, of these governmental associations." And these conditions make it such that "the kind of professor needed in the government-oriented university is one ... who though technically brilliant is philosophically orthodox, because the true dissenter, the man who dissents about purpose and not just technique, is likely to lose a sale."

Fulbright, I think, articulates what some of us deeply felt — that the combination of power and intellect requires a price. Assuredly it tends to promote a climate in which effective political opposition is conceived of as influencing the government only through the "proper" channels. As for morals leading to action, they now appear as something that no longer arm the will but only feed the memory.

Finally, I was impressed this summer by the search for new ways of learning. The various educational ventures germane to this have many aspects: unconventional do-it-yourself courses by concerned teachers or students on problems of race relations or the imperialist policies of "technetronic" societies; experimental work not just in creative writing but in all forms of aesthetic and intellectual activities that do not easily fit into the normal understanding of the "higher-learning"; the different interpretations of history that openly acknowledge the "revolutionary" assumptions from which they proceed. The process is a faltering one that even the most able minds find difficult to cope with. But it indicates a degree of frustration with the nature of the university as a center of learning which is having repercussions in Asian studies.

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Campus News

During the summer the Cornell CCAS sponsored a lecture series entitled “Asian Summer.” Accompanied by student discussion groups, the series covered a wide spectrum of topics on East and Southeast Asia and attracted about 300 people to each lecture.

Speakers and topics included: Prof. David Wyatt (University of Michigan) on “Thailand: The Next Vietnam?”, discussing and disagreeing with Louis Lomax’s recent book, *Thailand: The War That Was, The War That Will Be;* O. Edmund Clubb (Columbia) on “How the Chinese View the World”; Clubb emphasized China’s autonomous, pre-Western development and urged American withdrawal from Southeast Asia to permit independent states around China’s periphery; David Mozingo (Cornell) on “China and Revolution.”

Dr. Truong Buu Lain (Cornell, formerly of Saigon and Hue Universities) on “Vietnamese Cultural Traditions,” discussed the autonomy of villages and reactions to the French and Americans; Don Luce (Cornell, with International Voluntary Service from 1958 to 1967 in Vietnam) talked on “Prospects for Peace” and showed a filmstrip, “Remember Vietnam,” (available for $5, including a record, from Vietnam Education Project, 100 Maryland Avenue, Washington) prepared by him for the United Methodist Church; he brought out the brutality of the war and stressed the need for an early settlement. Prof. Kahin, Director of the Southeast Asia Program at Cornell, moderated the program.

Plans for the fall include further discussion and a seminar for high school students on Southeast Asia and American foreign policy.

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An Exchange

1. Peck to Vogel: Why Is the CIA Here?

May 6, 1968

Dear Professor Vogel,

We had talked earlier and briefly about the connections between the CIA, East Asian Studies, and the Institute. I’ve jotted down some of my thoughts on the subject to clarify and communicate my concern over the present relationship.

The readiness of East Asian Studies at Harvard University to lend its good name to the CIA for the training of its members and for co-operation in research projects may be just one small aspect of those complex ties that bind the government and the university. It may be done with the best of intentions on both sides. But the results as I witness them are inimical to my conception of a university and an educational environment.

Baldly put, the CIA by definition is subversive of the ideals of the university. Its business is subversion abroad; the result has been subversion at home. During the all too brief discussion of the domestic role played by the CIA during the National Student Association controversy, it was revealed that the CIA had subverted universities, labor organizations, student associations, research, publications, even churches. It stresses secrecy, anonymity, and is chauvinistic. Perhaps naively, I’d thought that a university

was by nature cosmopolitan and international, an institution that sought to extend the frontiers of knowledge through free debate without undue restraints and pressures (and often the worst pressures are unconscious). Perhaps unwisely, I fear the consequences that result when power and knowledge live in apparent harmony. For the reliance of power on knowledge looks not for the intellect considered as a freely speculative and critical function, but for expertise, for something that will serve a governmentally defined need. And to me the pertinent question is whether the intellectual as expert can really be an intellectual—whether he does not become a mental technician working at the call of those who hire him. The presence of CIA members in our midst, I think, accentuates the trend towards producing mental technicians.

Accordingly, the bond now existing between East Asian Studies and the CIA is just one aspect among many pushing people towards expertise, towards a narrowness of outlook, perspective, and sensitivity that I find prevalent in our field. Indeed, perhaps you are right (I still remain unconvinced, though) in saying that individual members of the CIA at Harvard are here just to educate themselves, that they do not report back on individuals or their expressions of political belief, and that they offer much from which we can profit. After all, they can investigate us without announcing their arrival. But even given the correctness of your views, their impact is different from what was intended.

Let me, for example, set forth one related group of incidents that are a result of their presence. Some individuals are genuinely intimidated. I wish the individuals who told me the way they guard their expressions of opinion in your seminars would also say so to you. For various reasons they will not be likely to admit this in public. Yet surely it does not aid the intellectual atmosphere here when some individuals associated with the CIA label some of the organizers of the Vietnam Caucus “Commie sympathizers.” Surely, you do not expect foreigners (I know of definite cases among the Taiwanese) to feel free to express their opinions given the reputation the CIA now has. I know of some who genuinely fear the CIA in this university! And surely, you cannot expect random comments by individuals linked with the CIA about “Peace Niks,” draft resisters, even about individuals wearing peace buttons, to be taken too easily by some students. Is it surprising that these individuals we knew were in the CIA were asked not to come to the general gatherings of students and faculty in East Asian Studies because some individuals flatly stated they could not freely express their opinion in their presence? You might dismiss these as unrealistic fears of the CIA. I’m not sure. But what people believe to be so probably influences their opinion much more so than what is actually so.

Perhaps, for you, these seem only insignificant examples that pose no major problem for intellectual freedom. Yet for me they constitute one aspect of the university that discourages radical criticism, disinterested intelligence, free speculation, and creative novelty. They are one element that encourages the growth of a type of professionalism that I have witnessed in the engineering and scientific world. For I grew up as a professor’s son and saw many professors devote a vast percentage of their time to projects for the Defense Department. There is a type of professionalism in such people: they do their work, sometimes on projects they feel are not even in the national interest, they advise for projects for which they feel no moral concern since it is the government’s responsibility, and they find that their doubts (if any) cannot be expressed because of the demands of secrecy. I would suggest that some of the unrest evident in universities today stems from a strong reaction against the extension of such notions of expertise in the humanities and social sciences and the concepts of “objectivity,” moral neutrality, and “professionalism” that some so strongly feel they imply.

Two final points. First, if we must carry out research work with the CIA, I’d hope that we do not indiscriminately make available our facilities, but select what is valuable to us, draw up tight regulations that safeguard the rights of the university to supervise and control the research, protect scholars, and avoid secrecy. This, of course, is easily said but hard to accomplish. And the element of secrecy involved is one I find incompatible with the purposes of a university.

Second, I do not think that individuals associated with the CIA can enter into the university under

conditions that I feel are essential for free debate. They cannot express their personal beliefs too strongly, challenge government policies too readily, or express too openly their values. But they can certainly serve to hinder those who could speak more freely.

Such are a few of my random thoughts about our relationship with the CIA and the broader problems it brings to my mind.

Sincerely,

(signed) Jim Peck

2. Fairbank to Peck: "Government Personnel Can Help Us and We Can Help Them."

May 8, 1968

Dear Jim:

I have read your letter of May 6 to Ezra Vogel about the CIA-Harvard East Asian studies relationship with the greatest enthusiasm because I believe you state very well some of the issues involved. They are, in my view, real issues and they will not go away, nor be easily resolved, but we can all consciously work on them. They relate to the nature of our society and our future and deserve the most careful attention from all of us.

The basic fact that confronts us is that the CIA or its equivalent will not cease to exist and it will in the future have some relationship to Harvard, even if it is a non-relationship. This is simply the kind of world we live in and it is full of dangerous tendencies. I subscribe to your feeling that a narrow, specialized expertise, if that is all our training produces, may lack perspective and sensitivity and may succumb to the request of the national interest for technical work toward unworthy ends. This is one of the great dilemmas of modern society, that our technology may be used inhumanely as when a good American boy becomes hardened in the course of duty to dropping napalm on villagers who may or may not be enemies. The Vietnam War has hit us so hard because it seems to so many of us to constitute an excessive application of our technological capacities. I am not trying to settle this great issue in this letter but merely to acknowledge its existence. It will not soon leave our lives.

I am also well aware of the concern that many students feel when they. understand that CIA personnel are working at Harvard among them. The secret use of CIA funds in the cultural and student exchange and similar fields was, in my view, rightly resented. Secret thoughts, hesitation to express oneself for fear of the consequences, and suspicion of others in the community, are not compatible with the American university tradition. Harvard has also stood for the free market place of ideas, on its merits, and the feeling that there are no limits on the exercise of the free mind. This we consider a great source of strength and an absolute necessity to the survival of our academic institutions. We certainly don't want this atmosphere poisoned by any feeling that secret police are among us and informers are at work and that one's cherished enterprises must therefore be protected by an equal secrecy. This could only lead toward divisiveness, conspiracy, and the shattering of community.

I see no complete and simple answer to this kind of problem. On the contrary, like most insoluble problems, it is something to work on. Our success will come insofar as we use our heads to keep our aims clearly in mind and deal with all the facts, without giving everything away to emotions. In other words, a proper moral position includes rationality and self-discipline as well as courage and self-expression.

One way to deal with this problem, which the CIA exemplifies, is to be restrictive and isolationist. We can fight off contact with the government and, under various pretexts, keep it minimized in the same spirit we can avoid contact with communists or other kinds of totalitarians from abroad or from within our society. This, however, will not make the issue go away and may only suppress it in an

unhealthy way.

We may wind up more in an ivory tower as a chosen few not ready to grapple with the very real problems we face.

I favor going in the other direction of inclusiveness and openness. Just as this Center intends to invite here various Europeans who are avowed Communist Party members and the like, on the basis of their capacity for some scholarly contribution to us, so we stand ready to have contact with anyone in the American government whose scholarly capacities likewise commends him to us. Our business is scholarship and the unfettered use of intellectual abilities. Our free market place of ideas cannot therefore exclude competent intellectuals just because they work for the U.S. Government.

Having uttered these truisms, we now have to get down to the facts of how things are worked out. First of all, the CIA has many mansions. Its personnel who come here to us openly as scholars are from its analysis section. They are not operatives. They are not the FBI concerned with domestic subversion. They come here because of their scholarly interest in East Asia, to learn from us what they can and use the facilities which the rest of us are using. Harvard's facilities are, of course, a national resource and I do not believe we should make them off limits to the U.S. Government.

It is distinctly understood that the CIA personnel who come here as scholars and students are confining themselves to that type of work, the same study of East Asia that the rest of us are pursuing. Since I do not believe in taking anything entirely at face value, I have made it plain that the efficiency of such people at Harvard would be immediately impaired if they were recruiting, reporting, or otherwise pursuing secret operations, not announced to us. I think we can see here a self-righting mechanism. If the CIA people who come seem unable to level with the rest of us, they may find themselves unaccepted in the community, in fact, and to the detriment of their mission here. For example, we do not expect them to bring classified materials with them nor to infringe upon the local atmosphere in which we have no classified subjects or materials of any kind.

Now if we look at this relationship more positively, I think we will soon find that the people who come here from the CIA are, indeed, specialists and students of considerable ability who are well up to working with the people here and making a contribution. In this larger view, the fact is that the U.S. Government has its problems of understanding and they are no less than we face at Harvard. The American people have not only great responsibilities but great ignorance to overcome regarding East Asia. The effort to overcome this ignorance is being made in the government as well as the universities. We have much in common and something to gain from joining forces occasionally. The interchange of ideas with other solid students can help us all. The issue here is not national defense but rather human survival. The CIA, as you may know, has the reputation in Washington of having the best knowledge of East Asia in intellectual terms because it has the most able personnel and they are given the best opportunity for study. The problem of China, for example, is simply too big to be considered merely as a national defense problem. It is a world problem and of vital concern to everyone. If we are really serious as scholars, we must seek light from every possible source as well as try to shed light. With the CIA there is every chance that we can do both. After all, Harvard is something like twice as old as the United States Government and may well survive it. We, and this includes you, can have an influence on the CIA. A relationship is not a one-way street.

What this comes down to is that our job at this University is not merely to be moral and humane but also to be informed and intelligent. Our aim is understanding. Government personnel can help us and we can help them. We want to do it with our eyes wide open and with no illusions. But to turn back from this opportunity, it seems to me, would be morally timid and intellectually unsound. I hope we can discuss this further.

Sincerely,

(signed) John K. Fairbank

3. Riesman to Peck: The University as a Railroad.

15 June 1968

Dear Mr. Peck:

Down with the flu for the last ten days, I have only now had a chance to read your letter of May 6 to Ezra Vogel and John Fairbank's reply to you of May 8. I have not had a chance to read the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars' Newsletter. I must say to you (and to Messrs. [*sic*] Kagan and Livingston through you) that I find what John Fairbank says sympathetic, and that I really do not see any intelligent and legitimate way to purify Harvard University, as you and your coworkers would like to do. In any event, I see a university as more like a railroad, a public utility which will take different people to different destinations; I think efforts to impose on it more idealistic or ideological purposes will only in the country as a whole succeed in imposing restrictions and limitations. Furthermore, your sense that intimidation only runs one way — from the CIA to your fellow graduate students, seems to me a strange comment on the qualities of openness that I myself see among graduate students, and among indeed the majority of the undergraduates with whom I work. In fact, in both my major sources of contact with undergraduates, the large General Education course I direct and my service on the faculty committee for the Social Studies Program, it is generally the more conservative Harvard and Radcliff students who are intimidated and feel oppressed by the prevailing vocal radicalism of these particular environments. Anyone, for example, who dared to say a good or even an equivocal work for the CIA would find himself, if not ostracized, at least looked on dubiously. The devotion to purity and to watertight compartments among these students matches your own. It creates an atmosphere in which I have sometimes had to encourage Southerners (who are often automatically and with great bigotry assumed to be bigoted), supporters of the late Robert Kennedy or other supposedly square people, to speak out in an atmosphere dominated by the prevailing and quite justified sense of outrage these students have shared. I imagine you will consider it mistaken of me to try to encourage these voices rather than to silence them, perhaps an example of the objectivity and neutrality that you deplore. But I cite this to show that it is not only apprehensive graduate students who fear that what they say will be reported to the CIA — or Taiwanese, who seem to me, as I said to you in my office, to present special and perhaps insuperable problems.

And as I also said to you, these are fundamentally political problems, to be fought out in a political arena, rather than in a university. I do not think that the University should be ignorant and innocent of who is here — rather the kind of precaution John Fairbank has taken to warn the CIA people that they must conduct themselves while they are here as students, not as operatives, seems to me on the right track.

In 1955, I worked on a survey sponsored by the 'Fund for the Republic (now the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara) of the impact of McCarthyism on academic freedom, especially among social scientists. In many universities, as you probably know, students acted as part-time stringers for the right wing press, and reported what professors said in class; others were running for the state legislature, and used quotes from classroom discussion as a club over their faculty. In many of the more benighted places even today, as I am sure you know, professors are being monitored in much the same way. While universities can do something to protect faculty and students from harassment, and to provide an open forum for them, nevertheless, it has not seemed to me that they can close the place completely against such external sources of pressure; these too must be fought out in the general arena of politics.

These reflections, I know, will not be novel to you. be novel to you. I share Professor Fairbank's appreciation of your having evoked them.

Sincerely,

(signed) David Riesman

4. Livingston to Fairbank: "Year of the Cop-out."

12 July 1968

Dear Prof. Fairbank,

Now that the CIA as an issue seems to be more or less settled — or ignored — here at Harvard, perhaps a slightly less emotional discussion is in order. This brief piece by Commager presents accurately, I think, the feelings and position of most of the "dissident" graduate students — at least how we felt in May; a lot of water has passed under the bridge since then. Polite, rational arguments over this type of issue seem quite remote, to say the very least, after what has happened this spring and facing what is likely to happen to most of us by fall. It seems to get progressively easier to hold opinions both "rev-olutionary" and apocalyptic (Prof. Reischauer's adjective) as conditions continue to deteriorate.

At any rate, you might find the article interesting if you haven't already seen it. I underlined the sections that seem to bear most closely on what we covered in our forum on university-government relations.

As you probably realize, we are no less disturbed by the presence of CIA operatives at Harvard after all the haggling than we were before our political satori this spring. In view of the events of this week for example, cooperation with the government in practically any form (especially with some thing as "tainted" as the CIA) is in our view positively obscene. I suppose we students are gradually being moved — regretfully — toward a general lack of respect for the profession. But that's just the way it is for us, and for most students, in *the* U.S.A. in July 1968. This is the year of the cop-out.

Sincerely,

(signed) Jon Livingston

5. Fairbank to Livingston: CIA Analysts and Operatives

July 16, 1968

Dear Jon:

Thanks very much for your letter of July 12 and the article by Professor Commager which you enclosed, "The University as Employment Agency," from *The New Republic* of last February 24. I subscribe to a great deal of what he says, most if not all of it, and in order to keep things stirred up, I pro-pose to circulate copies of your letter, if you agree, and this reply and the Commager article to the fourteen or more members of the Executive Committee of this Center.

I do not believe in splitting hairs but rather in making realistic distinctions. It is not a realistic consideration if I reply that the CIA analysts who have been at Harvard have not been recruiters? They did not come here for the purpose of recruiting and any incidental, informal suggesting of "recruiting" that they may have indulged in seems to have been very minor. On the contrary, the effect of their coming here has been a considerable enticement of their environment to recruit them out of the CIA, as far as I can judge, instead of get anyone else into it.

I think we arc also entitled to make a distinction between the analysis and the operatives in CIA. Anyone doing research on contemporary China has a lot of intellectual interest in common with the

analysts of that agency. This is a fact because the academic student cannot go t China but has to study it from a distance in much the same way that the CIA analyst has to. This then raises the question whether the academic researcher and the government analyst should have any contact. The Center committee here voted experimentally to invite a senior analyst to be here with us in the coming year.

We propose to surface him whenever it seems appropriate, not just to irritate student sentiment but rather to help us discuss contemporary China. In other words, our prospective CIA contact is meant to be a means to an end, which is to form the most realistic view of China that we can. Such views can influence policy if they are well based.

If our only aim at Harvard were to train undergraduates for life, we could leave the CIA analysts out of the picture. However, in the last decade we have undertaken to conduct research and this has provided an environment in which graduate students can more effectively develop their own capacities and researches. In a general way, we are seeking absolute knowledge, like the scientists in laboratories. The mistaken ideas that our government has had about China suggest that the search for truth about that place is an urgent matter. We generally understand that the CIA analysts have had the most realistic view in Washington. They are professional seekers after the facts and have had to train themselves to form judgments of the most basic sort.

We thus wind up in this Research Center with a mixed set of moral considerations. Most faculty members are in sympathy with the student protest against our war-like involvement in East Asia. In fact, a number of us have sounded off at various times over the last twenty years. I think most of us recognize the great importance of moral concerns in our attitude toward national policy and politics. If we left it at this, however, we would be indefensibly derelict in our duty of seeking knowledge, and when we seek knowledge on China, we propose to get it from all possible sources.

My conclusion is that we cannot solve any of these problems by over-simplification. Intellectual contact with a CIA analyst of long experience is not recruiting and is not underwriting American violence overseas. The proper emotions of protest have to be combined with making practical distinctions. Otherwise we can all wind up struggling with the heart instead of thinking with the head. My hope is that everyone who is here next year with a special interest in China and American policy toward China will join in outspoken discussion of both facts and policies, including the semi-facts and semi-policies that abound in this field.

I hope we can discuss this further.

Sincere regards,

(signed) John K. Fairbank

6. Livingston to Fairbank: Against the Brick Wall

July 30, 1968

Dear Prof. Fairbank:

I have no intention of institutionalizing our exchange into a confrontation by-correspondence, but frankly I think your response to my letter was so factually misinformed and so disappointingly imperceptive on the real issues that I simply had to answer you.

To begin with, you are flat wrong in asserting that recruiting does not go on at Harvard, or if so only in a minor way. In the past year two students I know well personally were “approached” and invited to join the CIA. At *least* one other student (about whom I have reliable information) was likewise reached by one of our CIA “guests” and was lured into signing on by the manipulation of his problems with the draft. It seems only reasonable to assume that a great deal more recruiting is going on in secret beyond my

narrow range of vision.

And far from liberalizing our CIA friends, a typical academic fairy tale, the only apparent result I can see is that Harvard provides a useful, if not invaluable, service to an organization, whose purpose — regardless of its competence in Asian affairs — is subversion plain and simple. Is this not indeed one of the practical and meaningful considerations you mentioned? I have even come to believe rumors that some students in recent years have been led to join the CIA by a member of the East Asian Research Center. What was shocking and disillusioning a few months ago now seems expect ably routine.

But all of this is secondary and, hopefully, verifiable. What truly bothers me is the quality and logic of your justification for CIA agents studying at Harvard, under whatever aegis or banner. I find thoroughly naive your attempt to distinguish between "operatives" and "analysts" within the CIA. No one has yet produced an even vaguely convincing argument on this score, and on the contrary knowledgeable people say that one individual often performs both tasks simultaneously. Still more ludicrous is the characterization in your letter of the CIA as belonging to the hypothetical scholarly community, making it, in effect, one of the boys!

Yet, even if I were to grant you this point for the sake of argument, the conclusion which you have drawn is demonstrably untrue: though both are members of the same subversion factory, the right hand of the CIA doesn't know what the left hand is doing.

Or, even worse, it doesn't really matter if it *does* know! This sort of super-rationalized attitude represents, to me at least, a horrifying lack of intellectual integrity. According to this line of reasoning, an intellectual-scholar (or perhaps a liberal?) is somehow not responsible for the scholarship he produces. For example, it is permissible for Prof. X to do work on counter-insurgency techniques as long as he hands in his homework to an "analyst," and not to an "operative." He is never required to ask the most important question: How is my scholarly work going to be used?

Indeed, this seems to me to be the point at which you, and most members of the profession, have completely missed the boat. You refuse to inquire into the purpose of scholarship, when all around you are signs that much of the research on China and Southeast Asia is being grotesquely misused. Never the gut questions, i.e., what is it *for?*

Thus, to accuse an "Asian scholar" of complicity these days is largely a waste of breath. He usually doesn't know what the question means because he has never gotten around to recognizing that his polite agreements and arrangements with the government -or whatever — have often contributed substantially to the ability of our government to undertake boy scout projects like the genocidal war in Vietnam and the perpetuation of the Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship. Far too often the profession has served unquestioningly as Man Friday, furthering the obscene ends of American foreign policy.

In a word, what most Asian experts lack is any discernible sense of *responsibility.* And you blithely inform me that "a number of us have sounded off at various times over the last twenty years," and that you "recognize the great importance of moral concerns in our attitude toward national policy and politics," and then turn around and announce that morality takes a back seat when it comes to the "duty of seeking knowledge," a semi-mystical quest that apparently absolves one from all nagging doubts and moral questions. At least professional sell-outs like Scalapino and Pye are *honest* about why they cooperate willingly with the U.S. government, and they make no attempt to sell notion of neutrality of scholar-ship or hide behind an "apolitical" ostrich stance. If it is impossible to impress upon sensitive and intelligent scholars that governments, like individuals, are responsible for their actions actions, and that those who support reprehensible actions, whether consciously by participating or tacitly by allowing or ignoring those actions, are *also* responsible, then perhaps enlightenment is a bit too much to ask of supposed dialogue.

Anyway, there has already been far too much talking at, and not with. I am tired of knocking my

head against a brick wall.

Although this letter is addressed to you personally, it is directed at the whole profession. And it is not merely another emotional blast at a specific problem, but a deeply felt belief that intellectual honesty and integrity in our field have pretty much gone by the board.

Sincerely,

(signed) Jon Livingston

P.S. I believe I am keeping firmly in mind your earlier admonition to Jim Peck that "a proper moral position includes rationality and self-discipline as well as self-expression."

7. Fairbank to Livingston: "Righteousness Alone Is Not Enough"

July 30, 1968

Dear Jon:

From your letter of July 30 I get the impression that you know what is right.

I am for idealism and protest but I am also pragmatic and, when taking action, want to get good results. What action do you propose?

Sincerely,

(signed)

John K. Fairbank

P.S. So many matters of right and wrong turn into matters of degree: if we should keep CIA personnel away, should we accept their publications? If we accept the JPRS translations from New York, haven't we already lost our moral position? Or should we accept only the Hong Kong Consulate translations because they are State Department and not CIA? Or should we accept no translations and spend our time with morality alone and without knowledge? I am not trying to eliminate your point by logic but rather to indicate that righteousness alone is not enough.

8. Vogel to Livingston: You Underestimate Us

July 29, 1968

Dear Jon,

Prof. Fairbank has forwarded your letter along with that of Prof. Commager's article. I think you, and Prof. Commager, underestimate the extent to which faculty and university administrators have been concerned about many aspects of the relationships between the academic and government and have been expressing their concerns.

A couple of thoughts have occurred to me, and I would be interested in what thoughts or counter-proposals you and some of your friends might have. One would be to have an ongoing weekly forum during the year for the small group of concerned faculty and students that would examine broad questions that go beyond ordinary narrow academic papers, attempting to interpret what goes on in China (perhaps a separate forum on Japan?) and the rest of East Asia. It could in the process analyze what you think of as shortcomings in previous works and encompass attempts to improve on the present state of knowledge and understanding. A second might be the possibility of having representative groups of students, selected by a larger group of graduate students, go to Washington to present their case to appropriate levels of

officialdom. If you are just concerned with stating moral principles, then this may not have any meaning, but if you are also concerned with having an impact then this might have something to recommend it. What are your thoughts? (I will be at the above address until the first of September.)

Sincerely, (signed)

Ezra F. Vogel

9. Livingston to Vogel: The University and the Government

5 Aug. 1968

Dear Prof. Vogel,

It was good to hear your response to Prof. Fairbanks and my exchange on the CIA, etc. From the date of your letter, however, I suspect you won't be so sanguine when you read our most recent barbs. The correspondence has rapidly grown voluminous — I'm collecting it all — and now includes you, Jim Peck, David Riesman, Prof. Fairbank, and myself. There has even been a suggestion (from Prof. Fairbank) that the CCAS publish it, but he may want to retract.

Clearly, the interchange is leading up to what seems to me the crucial question: how the university is to relate to the government, and how we as scholars can reconcile our activities and political positions with moral imperatives that will not go away in the harsh light of "practicality" or expediency. If this seems to be an overly emotional approach or an overstatement of the true situation, such a criticism may be appropriate. But what is becoming increasingly apparent, at least to the graduate students here, is that emotion *cannot* be extracted from the debate, and in fact *should not be.* I think that emotion and moral concerns are implicit in virtually everything we have discussed this spring. He are outraged by Vietnam, by tacit scholarly support of The Government's China policies (and some not so tacit!), by CIA use of Harvard as a training ground because these seem to us to be *wrong objectives*, and not merely a question of different methods to common goals. It is the *ends* that we are addressing ourselves to first, the means second. This is a difficult problem and I hope to elaborate on it further with Prof. Fairbank; so stay around as the decibel count rises in Cambridge.

With regard to your suggestions, the weekly forum would appear to be an excellent idea, and if coupled with the earlier proposals for non-Ph.D.-directed seminars, could improve the quality of the East Asia? program significantly. On the second question, I suspect and hope that the CCAS will be our main arena of political combat and general education. In fact, one arm of the CCAS has already been involved in a publicity campaign against the new federal regulations on funds to universities. This is all good and fine, and anyway few of us have any desire to go to Washington to "present our case" and trust that the American democratic (!) system will respond to our grievances. That really is a waste of time, especially if others in the CCAS are working on similar approaches. It also presumes a much greater faith in the whole process than is currently detectable at Harvard.

These are essentially positive proposals, and I suppose you will be coming forth with more, but we consider the broader concepts mentioned above more worthy of discussion. To prod you into new lines of thought, I would suggest you take a look at Lewis Lipsitz's article in *APSR*, June '68, and at essays by Christian Bay and Marshal Windmiller in Roszak, *The Dissenting Academy.* These are topics which are currently gripping the participants in the Seldon [*sic*] seminar; they promise to be hot potatoes for some time to come, and they might even provoke you as well.

Sincerely,

(signed) Jon Livingston

P.S. Pardon the excessive underlining, but I can't very well get across vigorous finger-pointing and arm-

waving in a letter without it.

10. Vogel to Livingston: Emotion and Reason

August 9, 1968

Dear Jon:

I quite agree with your point that we should consider moral problems, and that scholars cannot retreat into claims of objective study without considering the context and the effect of their study. I personally feel that the Mannheimian notion that intellectuals can be perfectly detached from their social position has not stood up well for social scientists. I have long been convinced in my interviewing, for example, that the interviewer cannot be detached and scientific but brings certain attitudes to the interview situation and that the cause of knowledge will be furthered more by understanding these attitudes than by evading them.

I would, however, like to register one qualification to the necessity of considering the political implications of our scholarship. I feel that there is still merit for the scholar in his professional work to aim toward understanding the truth and to using accuracy and correspondence with reality as an important measure for judging his work. A scholar at a university has, if you will, a moral responsibility to pursue truth and to state the truth, even if this truth does not correspond to conventional or to non-conventional (i.e., radical) assumptions and political prejudices.

As for the introduction of emotion into debate, I think that on issues on which people feel strongly it is unrealistic to think of eliminating emotion. On the other hand, however, I do not think that emotion is a substitute for reason. I believe that even on issues on which we have strong conviction, we should be willing to think through the assumptions of our convictions and the consequences of our beliefs.

My personal view is also outrage at our Vietnam policy. As for tacit support of our China policy, I think there are considerable shades of gray. Is one who lives in America and continues to teach tacitly supporting our China policy even if he has publicly voiced objection to it? Is a scholar who has an advisory role in our government tacitly supporting our China policy while continuing to work within the government in an advisory role? Is it better to be ‘•morally pure” than to attempt to change policy and get involved in the complexities of implementing change? Having spent some time this summer studying revolutions, I am persuaded that revolutionaries, like conservatives, lost their moral purity when they made compromises in the attempt to gain support for their revolution. Would you justify their loss of moral purity and not the loss of moral purity of scholars who continue to work with the government despite their objections to government policy?

I personally do not think one can think in moral terms without consideration of consequences any more than one can pretend to think in objective scholarly terms without consideration of consequences. I am in sympathy with the general effort to find ways of withdrawing consent from our government when it pursues policies such as the Vietnam policy with which we radically disagree. I do not personally feel that our university refusing to accept CIA men would have the desired result. I feel it would force CIA into a retrogressive step, i.e., undercover secrecy. Either they would come here secretly without our knowing about it or they would recruit graduates without our knowing about it. At the present time, all the CIA people we know about who have come to Harvard in recent years go back to jobs of analysis: although you may disagree, to my knowledge they have been the most vocal and effective critics within the government of our general efforts in East Asia. It is possible that Harvard is also training CIA operatives for East Asia, but if so this is done entirely without our knowledge. Are we morally pure for not knowing about this and morally impure for accepting analysts whom we know about?

I am pleased to hear you are in favor of the program of weekly forums in the fall. My own conception of the ungraded seminar is that it concentrates on 1st year students and will be more completely in the hands of faculty. I had thought of the forum as a more strictly voluntary group (the ungraded seminar is, in effect, required of first year students) of students, mostly beyond the first year level. It could make use of some of the products of the summer Selden seminar, but it could also bring in outsiders of varying persuasion from Neale Hunter, hopefully Chesneaux et al., and of government employees as well. Although this is my present thinking, I think that the final form of the forum could be a result of collective thinking. I suggest that some of us get together shortly after my return to Cambridge about September 10 to discuss the final form.

My suggestion about talking to government officials was not designed to take the place of newspaper or other publicity, but to supplement it. I have no illusions about the readiness of government employees to adopt automatically something they are told by radical students. I am persuaded, however, that over the years there is a tendency for the government officials to see too much of the American business and academic elite and the political elite of other countries and to develop a frame of reference that gives inadequate concern to the ordinary peoples of the world and to our own students. I think this is a subtle process, and I think more frequent exposure to radical students could serve as an important corrective to them, as well as helping them realize that radical students have given some very careful thought to important issues. I think the interchange would be useful to the students because it would help them better to understand the governmental processes and help them to zero in more precisely on the crucial levels when trying to influence. Although faculty members who serve as consultants for the government are constrained from criticizing too vocally the officials they work with, I do not think that radical students would be subject in any way to the same constraints if they had contacts with government officials. Although I personally think that such contacts would be a good idea, this is strictly my own idea, one I have not broached to government officials and which I will not push if none of the radical students is interested.

Although I do not believe that infra-office letters should be publicized, I have no objection if you wish to reproduce parts of all of our interchange as long as it is not taken out of context to say something I did not mean.

Sincerely,

(signed) Ezra F. Vogel

11. Livingston to Vogel: Scholars Responsible for "Use" of Their Work

August 16, 1968

Dear Prof. Vogel,

I would like to respond directly to two very important questions in your letter — the issue of the scholarly search for "truth" and the broader problem of the complicity of China scholars with the government. Then I will try to explain my personal criticisms of the professional syndrome that has produced such complicity and uncritical acceptance by scholars of near genocide, salvation-by-destruction, etc.

On the first point, I am pleased to see that you agree with me generally on the political implications of scholarship and on the emotional, controversial nature of vital political problems. Moreover, I agree completely with your emphasis on accuracy and truth. I have gradually come to accept Noam Chomsky's position on this issue; namely, that truth tends, by definition, to be radical and subversive of the existing order. This may in fact be a rationalization on my part, but it seems to be a reasonable stance. Thus, a political line can never justify the distortion of truth — I am still enough of a

"scholar" to believe in this much. However, I must also say that I believe over-reliance on "reason" is basically escapist. Reason is simply and only a tool, to be used to further whatever ends one wishes. It is *not* an end in itself, in spite of the desire by many to worship such procedures as reason, logic, and pragmatism as cardinal virtues. This view fits neatly into American-style utilitarianism, especially since a "resort to reason" is continually used to justify existing conditions, exhort others to be practical, etc. Frankly, I have no use whatsoever for practicality and reason unless they are subordinated to basic human needs. Otherwise, reason is nothing more than oppression (compare the misuse of this concept with the equally distorted "free" in the mythical "free world.")

But to get to the immediate issue:

Yes, I do think Asian scholars are complicit in, or to be more exact *responsible* in some sense for, the government's China policy, even though they "quietly...voiced objection to the China policy while continuing to work within the government in an advisory role." It seems to me that there are two main aspects of this: the moral and the practical.

Morally, a scholar is, quite simply, responsible for the ultimate "use" to which his work is put. There is no room for complaints of misuse when the "output" is so painfully evident in the forms of support for Chiang Kai-shek, containment of Communist China, and the application of scholarship in Vietnam, etc., etc. Logically, those who have contributed to the making of China policy are obligated to make public their part in that sad misadventure and take the knocks that are assuredly coming. More people than Dean Rusk are due credit for the past decade's debacle-lots of academic China experts had their fingers equally much in the foreign policy pie. How to go about establishing political innocence I really couldn't say. But one thing is clear: most of the top academics in Chinese studies have had a hell of a lot to do with arranging the mess we are now in.

Practically, there is much less ambiguity. The discernible results of your (and others') efforts to influence policy from within the system are virtually zero — more a holding operation than anything else, and hardly a sweeping tide of reform. *The Nation* of August 19, referring to American support of Franco's Spain, could very easily be pointing at China scholars bent on "subverting" the government: American spokesmen talk of humanizing the regime from within — which is what people always claim they are doing when they cannot otherwise justify a distasteful alliance, and which in this case does not seem to have been a conspicuously successful instance of foreign infiltration. In your own terms, and certainly in any measurable sense, liberal-university subversion of government departments and policies has been a total failure. The only apparent "success" is an ever-expanding government collaboration which results in providing legitimacy and support for government policies. So much for "getting results." There is no need for me to preach about moral purity or evangelistic idealism...this is *plain pragmatism.*

One other facet of this situation is what James Thompson convincingly described, in his *Atlantic* article, as the "effectiveness trap," This is surely one of the most apparent failings of academics when it comes to dealing with the federal government. Virtually everyone is paralyzed by the desire to retain influence and effectiveness; and for many this activity becomes a consuming need, far more important than sorting out rights and wrongs. No one is willing to commit himself morally because that might short-circuit his links with the power center in Washington. It is difficult to decide whether these people are *prevented* from taking dissident stands by the lures of government funds and being "where it's at," or whether they don't have the minimum moral outrage to even *want* to dissent. In any event the result is the same: they are silent when silence has a rather damning, not neutral, quality to it.

At a tine when some of us are on the verge of virtually putting our lives on the line in order to halt the crimes our government is committing in our names, the response of *faculty members in the profession most intimately tied to the war* is revealing indeed. They have, of course, expressed their vague, somewhat inarticulate discontent with what is going on "over there." Yet, there is an unmistakable hint of Business As Usual. Throw the CIA out of Harvard? Don't be immature or rash — let's work this out

rationally; after all, we want results, now, don't we....

I cannot presume to decide for anyone but myself what ought or ought not morally be done; for even in the heyday of TV and mass culture, conscience still remains an individual activity to the extent that it still intrudes uncomfortably on our consciousness. I simply know that I am incapable of rationalizing away the horror of Vietnam or the related, concrete immediacy of the CIA on our doorstep, and I will have a straight answer 20 years hence when I am asked, "Where were you when…?" I *am* also beginning to understand what the neutrality of scholarship really means in human terms; its euphemistic clarity is like that of a mountain stream: crystalline and shallow at the same time

Sincerely,

(signed) Jon Livingston

12. Vogel to Livingston: "Moral Purity" Trap

August 21, 1968

Dear Jon:

One virtue of disputation is that it clarifies the issues and the points of disagreement.

One issue on which we disagree is the capacity of academics, especially Asian scholars, to influence governmental policy. I believe you underestimate the contempt which most working governmental officials have for the opinions of academic specialists who are not working within the government on current events. I really do not see anything any of us academics could have done that would have made much difference on our Vietnam policy even if we had seen the absurdity of the policy and the course it would take with the foresight we now have in hindsight. Did Roger Hillsman or Jim Thomson or even Arthur Schlesinger's resignation from the government help bring about a change? To be sure, there is an "effectiveness trap," but I think one might say there is a "moral purity" trap too, "for the person who remains morally pure accomplishes little except to salve his own conscience.

I think you even miss the role CIA analysts have played in Vietnam. From what I gather from friends in Washington, the CIA analysts come closer than anyone else to getting our government to see the absurdity of the Vietnam policy. Would these men have contributed more to themselves, to policy, to the government if they had left government service?

I agree that scholars' efforts to change government policy from within the government (I would rather say the "periphery" than "within" for they are not given major roles in ordinary decisions) has been a failure. But so has the effort of scholars from without.

You are, of course, right that faculty have often been spineless and that they have not sacrificed themselves to help students escape from military service. But how many students have sacrificed themselves for faculty when faculty faced various kinds of problems (smears in McCarthy days, etc.)? To be sure, everyone is willing to fight harder for things that most concern him than people who face less immediate difficulty. I do think, however, that many of us would be willing to exert ourselves more if we were persuaded we could really help. My point about CIA officials at Harvard is not "don't be immature" or "don't be rash," but that this is attacking the wrong guys and not doing any good in what most of us feel is the main task: getting our governmental policy changed. Not that I have the answer, but I don't think this is it.

Sincerely, (signed) Ezra F. Vogel

13. Livingston to Fairbank: A CIA Proposal

20 August 1968

Dear Prof. Fairbank,

I apologize for the hyper-moralistic tone of my last letter, but, as you may have guessed by now, the issues I talked about have assumed an importance they would never have in a peace-time situation. For someone directly threatened by his government with a term in the military as indentured killer-mercenary or with a probable jail sentence, these issues go far beyond professional ethics. For the sake of clarification and continuation of the "dialogue," I would like to take the offensive more coolly this time, as I have been doing concurrently with Prof. Vogel in California. But this is not an especially meek apology, for the object was, after all, to foment discussion; and as we all know, you yourself are not above "provocative" tactics....

To summarize my feelings briefly, I believe that getting "good results" when taking action is an admirable goal, but that, in some circumstances, there is an absolute moral imperative to take action that may or may not produce "good results." If there has ever been such a time for Americans, it is surely now. Regardless of your immediate political position on Vietnam (short of unqualified support for the containment of Asian Communism by "any means necessary,") you must admit that the results of our actions have been, in practice, inadvertent genocide. Our original goals *may* have been decent, although support of an oligarchic dictator is hardly praise-worthy, but we long ago should have admitted defeat; indeed, it is increasingly evident that there is no justification for even having *wanted* to win. Our cause has never been particularly just; it is now a dark stain on the American conscience.

Furthermore, it is important at this point to be blunt and honest about what we mean by "reason" and pragmatism. If your definition of them somehow extends a blanket approval to current status-quo foreign policy, to the "responsibility of power," and to anti-communist assumptions, then we are not talking about the same animal. For me, reason and rationality are useful intellectual tools for uncovering the truth and for thinking effectively. Reason has never been for me an end-all, be-all sort of thing: when rationality and pragmatism gain too iron a hold over my life, then it's usually time to get a little "irrational" and break their grip. In short, I don't worship "reason" any more than I go out and prostrate myself before the MBTA subway because it transports me as efficiently through the Massachusetts underworld as "reason" does through the academic-intellectual jungle. Indeed, they both tend to break down with alarming frequency, and are probably not to be trusted too faithfully.

Still more important, though, is the conflict here between principle and expediency. At what point does a person find himself compelled to say "no" to an expedient (even "reasonable") measure and declare his ethical-moral position? I cannot prescribe a formula for something like this as a doctor might; rather, I am suggesting that there are often cases when a position simply must be taken, fully aware that the consequences may not be very desirable, and (2) there *is no* doctor; each individual must decide for himself on the proper course of action; no oracle or soothsayer is around who can give even the minimum of advice. Thus, I find myself *forced* by objective, observable events to recognize what is an absolutely insoluble contradiction: being practical and reasonable is impossible if I am to retain any shreds of sanity or honesty. Is a time of "saving" cities by destroying them one when a thinking person can sit on the sidelines and be "reasonable''? I would suggest a distinct and, if you will, moral "no." In this instance principle and expediency have become mutually exclusive.

What does this mean in terms of immediate action? It translates very simply: this is the time to draw the line. I propose, therefore, the following:

The various Harvard departments and programs concerned with East Asia, in conjunction with the East Asian Research Center, will announce publicly that henceforth their policies with regard to CIA personnel (analysts and operatives) would be to exclude them altogether from participation in any

Harvard Asian programs. As long as the government continues to practice genocide in Vietnam, condone oppression in Thailand and Laos, and minister to immoral objectives in its Asian policies generally, that we would feel constrained by our consciences neither to participate in, nor allow Harvard facilities to be used for, such purposes. “Toleration” cannot justifiably extend to institutions devoted to the destruction and oppression of Asian peoples.

What, in turn, will this produce in the way of results and consequences? Since I am not trying to avoid difficult questions, I will admit that the results may not be entirely pleasant. Perhaps exclusion of CIA personnel might mean a gradual cutting off of federal funds for the EARC, or the rise of barriers to Harvard faculty desiring to enter government service, or a deficiency in the ability of “analysts” and others to correctly determine foreign policy. I hope I have accurately anticipated your worst fears, for to me, at least, none of these would be particularly distressing in the long run, though perhaps momentarily troublesome. In fact, they would actually be welcome because they would lead to a vitally needed reassessment of many problems. For example, just how desirable is it to be financed primarily by federal and federally-minded (foundation) funds? How does an institution maintain its independence in such a situation? Perhaps alternate sources of money should be located. How bad could it be for the government not to be able to make “efficient” policy decisions? Given a Johnson-Humphrey approach to world affairs, the real need is for intellectual sabotage to the point where making foreign policy is as hopeless as ending the farm surplus problem—and its solution as drastic. Until visionary, or even decent and more humane, people retake the White House and the decision-making nexus, our job is to obstruct the government in every conceivable way--if we do, in fact, have mankind’s best interests at heart, and not merely a chauvinistic longing to keep the brainless bureaucracy running at top speed. This doesn’t necessarily require a positive commitment to a specific ideology or program, just the realization: what America has in mind for the rest of the world is probably worth trying to prevent.

Does this seem as though I am saying of our government, “presumed guilty until proven innocent”? If so, fine. The past twenty years leave some room for doubts (in Europe, for example), but the case is overwhelmingly against us. A new start can only be made with the acknowledgement of our own implication in the Cold War and with a powerful commitment to sweep the academic environment clean of reactionary atomic idiocy and nonsensical desires to “Make the world safe for (American capitalist) ‘democracy’....”

Sincerely,

(signed)

Jon Livingston

14. Fairbank to Livingston: “Only the Police”

August 27, 1968

Dear Jon:

Much of yours of Aug. 20 is cogent and OK by me, but when you get to the point where conscience demands *action,* I have trouble following the argument. Is your only available course of action negative and obstructive? What about *positive* and *constructive* action? I had hoped that instead of moralizing in words, someone this summer would study the actual situation in federal financing. (It is no help to say “Perhaps alternative sources of money should be located.”) You seem to tend toward the idea of closing down Harvard and abandoning civilization in a fit of moral righteousness. I am sure you are more intelligent than that.

I hesitate to distribute this present exchange for fear of disrupting contact with my committee. Some of them will read your proposal not “to allow Harvard facilities to be used” as a threat to violence.

They will then argue that righteous resort to violence is precisely the trouble with the world — in Vietnam especially but not only there, also with the USSR in Prague, Agnew's "shoot looters" idea, and so on. Whatever the balance between reason and moral feeling, I favor constructive action because destructive action can destroy us all, first the liberals, then the left, leaving only the police.

Yours ever,

(signed)

John K. Fairbank

15. Livingston to Fairbank: The Breaking Point

6 September 1968

Dear Prof. Fairbank,

I suppose every dialogue has its breaking point; ours seems to have at least arrived at a stage of severe stress, if not one of snapping quite yet. For one thing, it is rather tiring, sans secretary, to keep up the letter writing pace of the past couple of months, and — most crucial to me — the final result seems disappointingly to have been *nil*. Originally, I wrote to you with the hope, apparently illusory, that perhaps you could be politically stimulated or, minimally, brought around to seeing a different point of view. This was quite clearly hopeless. In your own words, it is when my arguments "get to the point where conscience demands *action*, I have trouble following the argument." That was quite an admission: it was the *only* major theme I have been writing about this summer. I will simplify my letters, for the sake of clarity (maybe my writing style really is hard to understand!), to a sentence: We must attempt to link morality, somehow, to humane and rational action. Is this direct and clear enough?

As a matter of information, someone is studying the actual situation in federal financing (Jonathan Grant at Berkeley), and is finding it to be a 1–2 year undertaking. I, too, had the intention of taking action; indeed, I believe I suggested a rather strong plan of action vis-à-vis the CIA. But let's be perfectly honest — it was out of a moral conviction on my part, that I suggested this, and not some bureaucratic need to be "pragmatic." I am also aware that merely *saying* that new sources of money should be found is not sufficient; but I was, after all, bringing up an issue of great importance, with numerous implications for universities in general, that seems not to have crossed many minds at Harvard. It is surely worthy of discussion.

As for having to decide between "constructive" and "destructive" forms of action, I firmly believe (and stated clearly) that in some circumstances there may not be a morally decent "constructive" course available. Unfortunate perhaps, but it seems undeniably true of a number of issues you would prefer to sweep under the rug. It also is vaguely tempting, I admit, to toy childishly (and temperamentally?) with the "idea" of closing down Harvard (and how much of a "loss" would that actually be? In the 1960's it is obvious that it is civilization and its academic sidekicks which are deserting, or rather screwing, the people—not vice versa), but that really wasn't my point at all. If you will examine my suggestion carefully, you will find that it is quite limited in scope and is aimed simply at trying to establish some limited moral basis for action in a profession seemingly without *any* standards. My error seems to have been not according the university and its various divisions what is usually termed "the respect it deserves." I hope you know by this time why I did not.

The problems of becoming overly self-righteous and sounding strident and preachy is always something to watch out for. I try to be careful not to step on too many toes. But I must say, after this experience, that I don't think I could lecture anyone anymore about anything (if I ever could). It is simply sad that, even with my vigorous and often impolite prodding, you still haven't managed to grasp the real issues.

Sincerely,

(signed)

Jon Livingston

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We welcome articles, letters, suggestions, or complaints and would especially like to extend a request for such beyond the east coast. The newsletter is still in the incubation period and can take any shape its subscribers would like.